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Introduction 
Tools of  Meaning
Massimo Leone*
A tool is an entity whose agency is not predominantly intentional. A knife 
can be used to cut a slice of  bread but this capacity must be exerted by an 
intentionality stemming from another entity, such as a human being. The 
definition allows one to explore the extremities of  its spectrum.
On the one hand, when the intentionality of  an agent involved in a prac‑
tice is suppressed, it falls into the ontological category of  tools, although it 
may traditionally be held as extraneous to it. In slavery, human beings keep 
their agency, yet it is entirely devoted to reach the goals of  alien intentional‑
ities. The transfer of  agency from slave to master, moreover, is not compen‑
sated through symbolical attribution of  potential agency under the guise of  
money. In mainstream employer–employee relations, the latter yields part of  
her agency to the former, but the former compensates this transfer through 
an equivalent transfer of  potential agency through the form of  a salary. If  
it is too low to compensate the initial transfer of  agency, then exploitation 
takes place, and the employee starts to be configured like a tool rather than 
as a worker. If  the compensation is null, then, alienation takes place, or even 
slavery, and the used human being is turned into a tool.
On the other hand, the dehumanization of  a human being into a tool is 
symmetric to the humanization of  a tool into a human being. Most tools 
seem to have no intentionality whatsoever. Furthermore, they seem to be 
deprived of  any agency too. A hammer neither can decide whether, when, 
and how to act nor can act without the physical and cognitive impulse of  
another agent. Yet, tools necessarily are human artifacts. Even a coconut, if  
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it is used to smash a softer object, ceases to be a natural entity and absorbs a 
specific cultural connotation because of  the fact itself  of  being grabbed, held, 
and used in a certain way. As a consequence, there is no tool that is entirely 
devoid of  agency and intentionality. A hammer’s intentionality resides in its 
affordances, that is, in the series of  characteristics that are likely to move an 
agent toward grasping and using it in a certain way. As Umberto Eco used 
to underline, we can use a screwdriver to clean our ears, but that would be 
a wrong interpretation of  the screwdriver’s affordances and lead to a painful 
misinterpretation of  the affordances of  our own ears.
More generally, behind each tool there hides a project that shaped it so as 
to somehow predetermine the modalities of  its usage. When we use a ham‑
mer, then, although we might cultivate the illusion that only our intentional‑
ity and our agency are involved, these must actually negotiate their exertion 
with those that are inscribed in the project of  the tool itself. When we ham‑
mer a nail, our intentionality works in synergy with those who first thought 
that a good way so as to have objects stick together is to pierce them through 
these metallic devices that we call nails and that a good way to pierce objects 
with nails is to batter them into the objects’ matter through another harder 
object, a tool, which can be grabbed by a human hand and at the same time 
produce an impact that is violent enough to subjugate the resistance of  the 
matter to be nailed.
Even in the case of  such a simple tool as a hammer, the intentionality 
and the agency that a human project has inscribed into the predetermina‑
tion of  its likely usage are not neutral but descend from a cultural ideology. 
Those who first invented the hammer, for instance, adhered to an imagina‑
tion of  matter as something that must be subjugated in a permanent and 
rather violent way, through nailing and perforation. In the building and 
rebuilding of  Shinto shrines at Ise, Japan, on the contrary, nails are system‑
atically avoided, so that the huge wooden temples are assembled through 
mere dovetailing of  components. Such ritual shunning from nails and ham‑
mer indirectly voices a different ideology of  matter, according to which 
its being never entirely devoid of  spiritual dignity requires one to refrain 
from violently vanquishing it and to develop, instead, means and tools of  
construction that are gentle to its inner fi bers. A standard Ikea bookshelf  
assemblage kit does not contain any nails either, but absence of  tools in this 
case results from a different project and from an alternative ideology, that 
which, conversely, predetermines that customers must be able to assemble 
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furniture without using other instruments than their bare hands or those, 
like the « Allen key », which are light enough and cheap to be included in the 
kit (wherein, hence, plugs replace nails).
The more complex a tool, the less unconscious and innocuous its ideolog‑
ical predeterminations are. There is ideology in a hammer but it is the kind 
of  inertial bias that seeps through the history of  human cultures without nec‑
essarily stemming from a clear ideological project. Software, on the contrary, 
is a tool in relation to which the transfer of  agency and intentionality from 
human beings to non–human entities is so encompassing that its ideological 
potential is necessarily enormous, although software is often designed pre‑
cisely with the purpose of  distracting its users from the perception of  how 
biased its design is.
Complex software that replaces the activity of  a university registrar, for 
instance, embodies an ideological bias under several aspects: 1) it has been in‑
tentionally devised so as to restrain, direct, and, therefore, control the agency 
and intentionality of  professors using it, although they might naively think 
that they are completely in control of  such software and that it actually mere‑
ly enhances their ability to act into the world; 2) through disintermediating 
the activity of  the registrar, it inevitably dehumanizes it, meaning that, as 
complex as the software might be, it (still) proves unable to react with average 
human flexibility to the complexity and, sometimes, singularity of  the cases 
it is confronted with; 3) it brings about an ideological predetermination of  
its usage, and of  the human activities connected to it, even beyond the inten‑
tions of  its designers and programmers (who might even be unaware of  how 
their “programming and designing culture” ends up being enshrined in their 
products).
Given the adoption of  these complex tools, to which human beings del‑
egate increasingly larger domains of  their traditional activity and whose be‑
havior becomes more and more unpredictable by human standards, a par‑
adoxical reversal of  agency and intentionality might take place to an ever 
greater extent: human beings progressively become the subservient tools 
through which exceedingly complex algorithms manifest their agency and 
intentionality as well as those of  the individuals, groups, and institutions that 
designed and programmed them.
That might present human beings with a dystopian scenario but at the 
same time reveals an aspect of  tools that has been often neglected throughout 
human history, that is, their content of  normativity. When I use a hammer, 
12  Introduction
the hammer also somehow uses me, for it obliges my body and my mind to 
adopt a certain posture and a certain movement when I use it. If  I refuse to 
hold a hammer by its handle, I shall never be able to use it properly. Such con‑
tent of  normativity becomes all the more evident as the complexity of  tools 
increases. Microsoft Word, for instance, not only decides that certain words 
are a mistake, underlining them in red through the function of  automatic 
spelling checking — although they might be simply rare in a language —, 
but even “decides” in what languages users might write: users can choose to 
write with the Arabic alphabet, for instance, but the software will not allow 
them to “link” letters together as the correct Arabic or Farsi spelling requires.
The extent to which tools exert a predetermined agency and intentional‑
ity even when they seem to completely yield to the aims and goals of  those 
who use them does not depend uniquely on their complexity but on the fact 
that it ultimately derives from their predominant intended usage: it is not 
meant to modify the environment but the human cognition of  it. A hammer 
is primarily meant to modify the environment in its physical appearance. In 
a horror movie a hammer can be used to introduce fear in the mind of  a ter‑
rified interlocutor, but in its mainstream usage it simply works as prosthesis 
of  the human hand and fingers, able to beat reality with a strength that these 
are too soft to produce. A word processor shares with a hammer the quality 
of  being a tool meant to represent and magnify the agency and intentionality 
of  its users. Differently from a hammer, however, a word processor is not 
primarily conceived to modify the physical status of  the environment but 
the mental simulacra through which human beings interact with it. In other 
terms, word processors, software in general, and other similar complex de‑
vices are “tools of  meaning” in the sense that they modify the ways in which 
representations of  the environment intersect the cognitive, emotional, and 
pragmatic dimensions of  human life in it.
There is no sharp distinction but, rather, a polarized continuum stretching 
from a hammer to complex software that is able to automatically concoct 
a newspaper article. At the one end of  the spectrum, tools will be able to 
simply modify the physical appearance of  the world without exerting any 
impact on the human intelligence of  it; at the other end, they will have the 
capacity of  altering the cognitive apperception of  the world without affecting 
its physical appearance. In the middle between these two extremes, however, 
one will find tools in which the physical and the cognitive agency intertwine 
and blend, often in inextricable ways.
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Normativity, with its load of  biases, is distributed across the entire spec‑
trum. That is why the “semiotics of  tools” must systematically intersect those 
of  both fields of  law and religion. On the one hand, predominantly normative 
systems, such as most world religions and law systems, adopt both inert and 
agentive tools so as to bestow a specific order to reality: present–day law could 
not be efficiently administered without the existence and usage of  handcuffs 
or similar devices of  immobilization, yet how loaded these “tools” are with 
preconceptions about the human body and its range of  rights and duties! These 
preconceptions are more surreptitiously embedded in the soft power of  files 
and archives, with their cogent grammars of  routine documentality.
Similarly, Christian churches as we know them could hardly work without 
candles, but these “tools of  religious lighting” too are not neutral at all but 
stem from both a history of  lighting technique and its cultural consequences.
On the other hand, legal systems and systems of  religious beliefs are 
themselves extremely complex “tools”, handed down from generation to 
generation with their enormous ideological biases, so that groups of  human 
beings might create an order in the immanence of  the relations among them‑
selves as well as in the transcendence of  the imagined relations with a superi‑
or ontological dimension. In this case too, however, although human beings 
often believe that they use a certain legal code so as to guarantee social order, 
they are often directly or indirectly “used” or even, in the worst scenarios, 
“enslaved” by the code into the order. Analogously, they might think that 
sacred texts, rituals, and priests work as tools to enable the efficaciousness of  
communication with an imagined transcendence, yet these often turn out to 
“use” human beings for their own systemic purposes or even for those of  the 
instrumentalization that they undergo in the hands of  such or such hijacker.
Tools of  meaning are instruments of  human beings but they might also 
contribute to their instrumentalization. That is the paradox which the chap‑
ters collected in this volume seek to address through a wide interdisciplinary 
approach, defying common frontiers among disciplines, traditions, and his‑
tories so as to analyze the dynamics of  agency, intentionality, and normativ‑
ity across the entire spectrum of  cultural life, with a specific focus on those 
domains, law and religion, in which such dynamics coagulate and crystalize 
into the most influential “tools” of  the social predicament.
The volume stems from two symposia: the first organized by the Faculty 
of  Law of  Monash University at the Monash University Prato Center, under 
the initial impulse of  Richard Mohr and Nadirsyah Hosen, with the coopera‑
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tion of  IRSIG–CNR, Bologna (Research Institute on Judiciary Systems, Italian 
National Research Council); SRPP (Social Research, Policy, and Planning), 
CIRCE (Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Communication, Universi‑
ty of  Turin), and CES (Associate Laboratory of  the Center for Social Studies, 
University of  Coimbra), on June, 13–15, 2016 (« Technologies of  Law and 
Religion: Representation, Objects and Agency »); the second, organized at IR‑
SIG–CNR, Bologna, upon the initial initiative of  Francesco Contini, with the 
cooperation of  the same partners, on June 6, 2017 (« Observing Technologies 
of  Law and Religion: Aspects, Actants, Assemblages »). All the participants in 
the two symposia are warmly thanked. The volume is published thanks to 
funding from the Department of  Philosophy and Education Sciences, Uni‑
versity of  Turin (Massimo Leone’s Research Project « RILO 2016, B Line: « Se‑
miotics of  Aspectuality »).
